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Executive Summary
Deficiencies of micronutrients—particularly iron, 
iodine, vitamin A, zinc, and folic acid—wreak havoc 
on survival, health, and productivity around the 
world. Micronutrient deficiencies are often called 
"hidden hunger" because they do not manifest 
themselves in immediate physical signs but are 
insidious in causing disease. They are particularly 
problematic in India because of the sheer numbers 
of people affected: 35 percent of the world's mal­
nourished children live in India, and 42 percent of 
children in India are stunted. The Indian govern­
ment has not met its current goals related to 
reducing micronutrient deficiencies.
In order to increase the profile of programs aimed 
at eliminating micronutrient deficiencies on the 
policy agenda, the Micronutrient Initiative [an 
international nongovernmental organization, or 
NGO), created an India Micronutrient National 
Investment Plan [IMNIP], which laid out the ration­
ale and costs for addressing the problems. This plan 
has been well received and appears to have signifi­
cantly influenced likely funding allocations to 
micronutrient programs. Several features of the 
process by which the IMNIP was conceptualized, 
written, shared, and used were essential to influ­
encing the national policy process; these features 
include relevancy, timing, stakeholder involvement, 
information, publicity, leadership, and saliency. The 
IMNIP has clearly addressed questions of why and 
when micronutrient programs should be increased, 
and it has made plausible suggestions concerning 
what programs best tackle the problems and how 
they should be carried out. It is debatable who 
should be responsible for planning, funding, 
carrying out, and monitoring micronutrient pro­
grams; possible parties include the national gov­
ernment, state governments, NGOs, and the 
private sector. A take-home message is that policy 
decisions are often ambiguous and that debate 
about the best way to administer policy continues 
even after policies or budgets are passed.
As a staff member of an NGO that provides nutri­
tion programming consulting, your assignment is 
to recommend to the Government of India how to 
address remaining questions about implementation, 
funding, monitoring, and enforcement of the 
micronutrient programs and to try to make sure 
the government takes note of your recom­
mendations.
Background
Unlike protein and energy malnutrition, deficiencies 
in vitamins and minerals ["hidden hunger") do not 
manifest themselves in immediately obvious physical 
signs. Instead, they result in a host of insidious 
consequences, such as infant and child mortality, 
birth defects, attenuated child growth and devel­
opment, and poor productivity and mental capac­
ity. The major micronutrient deficiencies, based on 
prevalence and severity of consequences, involve 
vitamin A, iodine, iron, zinc, and folic acid.
India is one of the countries most affected by 
hidden hunger. Fully 35 percent of the developing 
world's malnourished children live in India.1 Forty- 
two percent of children in India are stunted [Inter­
national Institute for Population Sciences 1998— 
1999), with zinc deficiency as a major contributing 
factor. India has the largest number of vitamin A -  
deficient children in the world, and this deficiency 
precipitates an excess 330,000 child deaths every 
year in India [Mason 2003). An astonishing 79 
percent of children under age three and 56 percent 
of women have anemia [International Institute for 
Population Sciences 2006), most of which is due to 
iron deficiency. Each year in India 22,000 people, 
mainly pregnant women, die from the most severe 
form of anemia [Ml 2005). The impacts of inade­
quate folic acid during pregnancy have resulted in 
the birth of 200,000 babies with neural tube 
defects annually in India—a rate of neural tube 
defects 16 times the global average [Cherian et al. 
2005). Iodine deficiency is the reason 66 million 
Indian children are born mentally impaired each 
year and why intellectual capacity is reduced by an 
estimated 15 percent nationally [Ml/UNICEF 
2004).
Vitamin A, iron, and zinc deficiencies, when com­
bined, constitute the second-largest risk factor in 
the global burden of disease [Ezzati et al. 2002). 
Given the tremendous impact of micronutrient 
deficiencies on survival, health, and productivity, 
reducing micronutrient malnutrition is an impor­
tant dimension of six of the Millennium Develop­
ment Goals: those pertaining to poverty alleviation, 
universal primary education, gender equality, 
reduced child mortality, improved maternal health, 
and the combating of HIV/AIDS, malaria, and
1 This figure is based on child malnutrition statistics 
found in WHO [2005).
other diseases. The Copenhagen Consensus, a set 
of international priorities developed by an expert 
panel of international economists in 2004, identi­
fied the reduction of micronutrient malnutrition as 
its second-highest priority based on a cost-benefit 
analysis [the first priority was combating 
HIV/AIDS].
The Planning Commission is a group of Indian gov­
ernment officials, headed by the prime minister, 
who define India's Five-Year Plan, the most impor­
tant document guiding India's public expenditures. 
It is a five-year budget, and many important policy 
decisions are made in the process of planning it. 
The Planning Commission's 10th Five-Year Plan 
[2001-2006] set the following targets with respect 
to micronutrient malnutrition:
• Eliminate vitamin A deficiency as a public 
health problem.
• Reduce the prevalence of moderate anemia by 
25 percent and moderate and severe anemia by 
50 percent in children, pregnant and Iactating 
women, and adolescents.
• Achieve universal access to iodized salt.
• Generate district-wide data on iodized salt con­
sumption.
• Reduce the prevalence of iodine deficiency dis­
order [IDD] in the country to less than 10 
percent by 2010.
India has made headway toward these targets, but 
they are far from being met. Vitamin A deficiency 
is still a public health problem affecting a large por­
tion of the population, but only 43 percent of 
children (6-59 months] receive the recommended 
two doses of vitamin A per year. Anemia rates in 
children, pregnant and Iactating women, and 
adolescents have not significantly decreased—in 
fact, they have increased in recent years (Inter­
national Institute for Population Sciences 1998— 
1999, 2006], The prevalence of IDD has also likely 
not been reduced. In much of India, iodine fortifi­
cation is essential because iodine is not available in 
the diet. Yet only 50 percent of Indian households 
are using adequately iodized salt, in part because in 
2000 the law on obligatory salt iodization was 
relaxed (International Institute for Population 
Sciences 1998-1999], Mandatory salt iodization has 
since been reinstated, but the few years of relaxa­
tion was a setback for the goal of universal salt
iodization, and enforcement of salt iodization in 
manufacturing remains a challenge.
India's 11th Five-Year Plan spans 2007-2011 and 
presents a window of opportunity for influencing 
India's micronutrient policy. Because recent 
progress toward micronutrient deficiencies has 
fallen short of goals, the rationale for increased 
micronutrient programming is strong.
E nter the M icronutrien t Initiative
The Micronutrient Initiative [MI] is an international 
NGO based in Ottawa that works in 75 countries 
around the world. It was founded in 1992, after a 
pledge was made at the World Summit for Children 
in 1990 to protect the world's children from 
micronutrient malnutrition. The mission of the 
organization is to eliminate vitamin and mineral 
deficiencies.
The Mi's Asia regional office is in New Delhi, India, 
where it was well positioned to act in the Indian 
policy process. The Ml sought to inform, and in 
some sense create, debate about micronutrient 
programs at a key time in national decision making, 
with participation of key stakeholders. The vehicle 
for doing so was the planning, writing, and dis­
cussing of the India Micronutrient National 
Investment Plan [IMNIP], put together in order to 
influence the policies and allocations of India's IIth 
Five-Year Plan.
The process of creating the IMNIP is an example of 
a successful approach to influencing the policy 
process at a national level. Writing the IMNIP and 
gathering stakeholder input and commitment took 
place in 2005-2006—exactly when government 
officials were actively forming their priorities and 
coalitions for the next five-year plan. The Ml built 
its arguments and policy recommendations on the 
government's existing goals and actions against 
micronutrient deficiencies.
Additionally, the government, at the level of the 
prime minister, encouraged the development of this 
investment plan as an opportunity to examine the 
financial and programmatic needs for addressing 
the micronutrient malnutrition problem adequately. 
Stakeholders and key decision makers from central 
and state governments, nonprofits, and the private 
sector were included in outlining and revising the 
IMNIP.
The document itself lays out suggested policies in 
specific, concrete terms, along with bottom-line 
costs. It was formulated so that it could be imple­
mented as national or state policy, complete with 
intervention options, target coverage over five 
years, and additional costs per beneficiary. It 
presents the financial gap between existing alloca­
tions and the allocations that would be necessary to 
achieve the levels of service provision required to 
reach the goals laid out in the 10th Plan, plus a few 
new goals.
As of this writing, government officials have 
accepted the plan, and a few of them have made 
the plan one of their primary agendas in the Plan­
ning Commission. Based on the broad support in 
the Planning Commission, the actions of key 
leaders, and the general publicity concerning the 
need for policies to combat hidden hunger, it 
appears that much of the IMNIP will be incor­
porated into 11th Five-Year Plan.
The following are a summary of actions that 
illustrate the principles of successful influence over 
the policy process:
1. Relevancy. Building upon an existing foundation 
makes policy objectives relevant. IMNIP sug­
gests activities that build on the government's 
own previously stated goals. The plan proposes 
to use existing infrastructure for nutrition 
programs where possible.
2. Timing: Efforts to influence national or state 
policy are most likely to be effective if they are 
concurrent with planned budget and 
programming revisions or renewals. The Ml led 
the process of creating the IMNIP in the 
period just before the next five-year plan.
3. Stakeholder involvement: Integrating the interests 
and input of key stakeholders early in the 
process was essential to creating ownership of 
the goals laid out. The MI recruited a team of 
stakeholders to begin the planning and buy-in 
for IMNIP at the very beginning of the 
process. Once a draft of the document was 
created, it was circulated among stakeholders 
for comment. The draft was left intentionally 
incomplete, with questions raised throughout, 
so that stakeholders reviewing it could be 
included fundamentally in the process. All 
comments were incorporated into a final 
document.
4. Information: Providing credible bottom-line
estimates for a variety of policy options allows 
well-informed decisions. The draft IMNIP 
included the cost of all interventions and realis­
tic target coverage figures, based on the per­
centage of the population currently reached by 
each specific intervention and the expected 
ease or difficulty of scaling up. This kind of 
information is critical if the proposed 
programs are to be taken seriously.
5. Publicity: The more public an issue is, the harder 
it is to ignore. The MI held a public conference 
with government officials as key speakers. The 
conference was reported in the media, 
increasing public interest in the issue.
6. Leadership: Finding a champion for the cause in 
a key position of power greatly helps to move 
agendas forward. MI staff met with particularly 
interested government officials, who became 
further convinced to increase the profile of 
micronutrient malnutrition on the policy 
agenda.
7. Saliency: Framing the issue so that it is central 
to the most prized goals of the government 
helps to make it salient. Both the IMNIP and 
government officials frame the issue in relation 
to economic development and human capital, 
in addition to humanitarian motives.
Policy Issues
The following policy issues were considered in the 
conceptualization and writing of the IMNIP: Why 
should micronutrient programs happen—is the case 
strong enough to justify public expense? When 
should micronutrient programs happen? What 
should the micronutrient programs be? How 
should the programs be carried out? Who should 
be responsible for planning, funding, and ad­
ministering the programs? The IMNIP addressed 
some of these issues thoroughly and left others 
open for debate.
Why and When
The IMNIP clearly demonstrated the magnitude 
and urgency of the problem by collecting relevant 
statistics on the prevalence and effects of hidden 
hunger. The cost of leaving micronutrient deficien­
cies unattended was calculated to be roughly
US$6.3 billion, 2 percent of India's gross domestic 
product (GDP), whereas the cost of the recom­
mended programs was only US$130 million per 
year: 50 times less than the cost of not addressing 
the problem. The cost per high-risk beneficiary 
(22.8 million pregnant women, 28.4 million adoles­
cent girls, 39.12 million below-poverty-line card­
holders, and 115.4 million children aged 6-59 
months) was about US$0.56 per year. This pres­
entation provided a clear rationale, showing that 
the costs of inaction are far greater than the costs 
of action and that the costs of the plan were, in the 
big picture of a national budget, incredibly small 
(less than 0.1 percent of the government's total 
expenditure budget). India continues to aim for fast 
economic growth, and government officials were 
swayed by the reasoning that malnutrition dampens 
GDP.
Furthermore, the IMNIP demonstrated that imme­
diate solutions were possible, given the infra­
structure (public health clinics, transportation, 
monitoring offices) and technologies (supplements 
and fortification processes) already in use in India. 
Recommended programs were structured around 
the existing resources, with a time frame that coin­
cided with government planning for the next 
budgetary cycle.
Thus, both why and when action should occur 
were answered quite persuasively. The recom­
mended programs are cheap and cost-effective and 
can be implemented with existing infrastructure. 
Because the bottom line was laid out up front, the 
government was easily able to use this information 
in its planning processes.
What
The activities included in the IMNIP were almost 
exclusively existing or planned government inter­
ventions. The recommended interventions include
• twice yearly vitamin A syrup for children 
9-59 months old;
• home-based fortification premix (such as 
Anuka or Sprinkles7' 1 ) for children 6-24 
months old;
• "Nutri-candies" containing iron, folic acid, 
vitamin A, and vitamin C for children 24— 
72 months old;
• fortified khichdi[di rice and lentil meal) for 
children 24-72 months old and children in 
the midday meals program;
• iodized/double-fortified salt and iron and 
folic acid-fortified wheat distributed 
through the Public Distribution System 
(PDS);
• iron-folic acid tablets for pregnant women 
and adolescent girls;
• fortified wheat flour with iron and folic 
acid for the general population;
• fortified milk with vitamin A for the 
general population;
• zinc as adjunct therapy for diarrhea;
• addition of zinc to fortified foods; and
• research on how to best increase dietary 
diversity.
H ow
In many cases, how the interventions were to be 
carried out was not clearly specified. This lack of 
specificity can be regarded as a weakness of the 
document because it does not provide a complete 
plan for carrying out the suggested interventions. 
The decision to omit operational details was inten­
tional, however, because it allows stakeholders in 
the government, as well as in NGOs and the 
private sector, to fit the suggested programs into 
their existing mode of operation, as they best know 
how to do.
W ho
The Ml recommended that in large part responsi­
bility for funding and administration be taken on 
by the central government. Costs were presented in 
such a way that state government officials using the 
document could also calculate the costs per benefi­
ciary of each intervention for their state, should 
they choose to include it in their state policy. The 
IMNIP left the debate over whether central or state 
government should pay for and institute the plan 
up to the legislators themselves. The IMNIP also 
recommended that private industry be involved in 
fortifying foods, in some cases voluntarily (wheat, 
milk, oil), and in some cases by mandate (salt).
Stakeholders
NGOs
NGOs can function as innovators of effective 
micronutrient interventions, as agenda setters and 
advocates (by encouraging the government to take 
action against the problem], and as informants to 
policy decision makers (by providing useful infor­
mation], They may have a stake if micronutrient 
programs align with their mission and if they can 
provide products, services, or consultation to 
micronutrient programs.
The Ml, in particular, has a stake because this 
project could make considerable headway toward 
its mission of eliminating vitamin and mineral 
deficiencies. The Ml has also created micronutrient 
innovations for interventions that may be used 
nationwide (such as "Nutri-candies"], bringing in 
funds both directly and indirectly through pub­
licity.
Other NGOs have a stake because they may be 
asked to provide a micronutrient product or 
service involved in the micronutrient programs. For 
example, Population Services International (PSI] 
wanted to be involved in the process of writing 
IMNIP because its experience with social marketing 
techniques may be needed if the interventions are 
scaled up to reach a larger portion of the popula­
tion. CARE is an example of another large inter­
national NGO with an agenda related to micro­
nutrient programs. Multilateral organizations such 
as the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF] 
also have a stake in being involved in any programs 
that target children's health.
The Central Government
The central government of India has a large stake 
in the issue of micronutrient programming because 
of the outlays required and the outcomes that the 
micronutrient programs are slated to produce. The 
government functions as the main funder, because 
it is responsible for making the final decision on 
allocations for nutrition programs. It also has a role 
as a planner in the process of choosing inter­
ventions that are feasible and as a coordinator, 
given that carrying out much of the plan would fall 
under the activities of existing government staff 
and infrastructure. Finally, the government can 
function as an enforcer of any policies that are
passed and as an evaluator of the programs it 
mandates.
State Governments
State governments each have a stake in micro­
nutrient programming because the policy options 
chosen will directly affect their budgets, operations, 
and constituents. Micronutrient deficiencies are 
more prevalent and severe in some states than in 
others, and political commitment varies by state 
(although it is not necessarily correlated with the 
extent of the deficiencies]. State governments have 
similar roles as the central government—as plan­
ners, coordinators, enforcers, evaluators, and 
funders—but over a smaller jurisdiction.
The Private Sector
The private sector's role in micronutrient policy is 
primarily as producers. Industry has a stake in 
micronutrient policy because it may be required to 
change its product to meet new standards. For 
example, a wheat miller may be required to add 
iron and folic acid to wheat flour and certify forti­
fied wheat with a nationally used logo. Alter­
natively, industry may have the option of choosing 
to change its products. For example, a local vitamin 
company may formulate a micronutrient premix in 
order to participate in or compete with the 
government program to provide a home fortifica­
tion micronutrient premix.
Although the private sector is often thought of 
simply as industry, private survey research and data 
analysis groups could also participate as evaluators 
of programs, and media groups have a stake as 
reporters and possibly advocates (by increasing the 
saliency of an issue]. The private sector is also a 
beneficiary of micronutrient programs: if workers 
are better nourished, they will be more productive 
and have fewer lost workdays.
Researchers
Researchers in the government, nonprofit sector, 
and private sector have a stake in micronutrient 
programs, because they often influence technical 
debates that can affect implementation.
Beneficiaries
Beneficiaries clearly have a large stake in micro­
nutrient policy, because the type and extent of
programs chosen may affect their ability to con­
sume sufficient micronutrients to remain healthy. 
They will certainly have viewpoints on which 
micronutrient interventions work best and who 
should administer them based on their experience 
with current or past micronutrient programs. 
Ideally, planners would consult beneficiaries in the 
process of increasing micronutrient programs to 
learn which interventions work and how to imple­
ment them effectively. In this case, target benefi­
ciaries were not directly included in the process 
because of logistical and political constraints. Their 
interests were indirectly represented through the 
input and arguments of other NGOs and their 
elected government leaders. Consulting benefi­
ciaries will be an important part of evaluating the 
effectiveness and appropriateness of micronutrient 
interventions.
Policy Options
The Ml led the process of bringing micronutrient 
policy options up for debate. As discussed, instead 
of lobbying the government or writing a plan 
independently, the Ml produced a workable plan 
with the inclusion of stakeholders from central and 
state governments and the private sector. This 
tactic was successful in creating a sense of owner­
ship of the IMNIP among government, NGO, and 
industry representatives.
Because of this participatory approach to the 
formulation of policy options, as well as the other 
strategies mentioned, the IMNIP has already influ­
enced the policy process for micronutrient 
programs in India. The process is far from over, 
however. Policies and programs on the books do 
not necessarily answer all policy issues; there is 
often considerable ambiguity left at the "end" of 
the process. Continued decision making about how 
programs should be administered and who is 
responsible for them are essential to successful 
implementation of the programs and policies.
So, at this stage of the policy process concerning 
micronutrient programming in India, what is left to 
decide?
There is general agreement on when programs 
should happen [now] and why the programs should 
happen [children are dying; programs are inex­
pensive compared with the costs of inaction]. These
questions were resolved persuasively in the IMNIP, 
with the participation of government officials.
There is ongoing discussion about exactly what the 
interventions to address micronutrient deficiencies 
should be and how they are best carried out. These 
debates, which will continue even after the Five- 
Year Plan is passed, involve technical issues about 
micronutrient interventions that are beyond the 
scope of the policy options in this case study.
The debatable issue left for this case study, then, is 
who should be responsible for planning, funding, 
and carrying out micronutrient programs? Who 
should be responsible for monitoring and enforc­
ing them?
Who Should Be Responsible for Funding 
and Carrying Out Micronutrient Programs?
The IMNIP was primarily directed to the central 
government, with options presented for state gov­
ernments and opportunities sketched out for 
NGOs and private industry. As the budget for the 
IIth Five-Year Plan is hashed out, any or all of these 
stakeholders could end up with responsibility for 
funding and carrying out the programs. A few pros 
and cons pertaining to each stakeholder are offered 
here.
• The central government
Pro: Programs carried out by the government 
can make use of a vast network of available 
programs and infrastructure. This capacity 
makes building on existing central government 
programs far more efficient than any other 
option.
Con: Levels of government program funding 
can shift based on who is in charge, and if key 
leaders leave [as often happens], funds or 
administration may not be delivered success­
fully. Corruption is a drain on available 
resources and thwarts progress in public health 
programs.
• State governments alone
Pro: States differ greatly in India [almost as if 
they are separate countries] and have different 
prevalences of micronutrient deficiencies and 
different needs. State officials are the most 
qualified and motivated to assess the best ways 
of addressing micronutrient deficiencies in
their state and should not be required to con­
form to national micronutrient policies and 
programs. They should have the autonomy to 
decide on the extent of their own nutrition 
programming.
Con: Individual state plans, as opposed to a 
one central plan, makes unified delivery and 
planning, as well as state comparisons, more 
difficult. Furthermore, micronutrient deficien­
cies are an issue of distributive justice that may 
be poorly addressed by individual states. In a 
centrally coordinated plan the worst-off states 
would receive the most funding for micro­
nutrient programs from the central govern­
ment, but if planning were left to the states, 
those states with very large burdens of micro­
nutrient deficiency may not necessarily invest 
in micronutrient programs; this failure would 
leave their citizens at a disadvantage.
• NGOs alone
Pro: Compared with governments, NGOs have 
relatively more flexibility to expand their 
budgets through increased fundraising and to 
focus their efforts on a particular issue such as 
micronutrient deficiencies. An NGO may be 
able to move fastest to get programs started. 
NGOs also have a strong motivation to make 
an impact, which will help them achieve their 
mission and raise more funds.
Con: Although NGOs can act quickly, their 
scope is limited. Government funds and infra­
structure are much deeper than any one 
NGO's own resources, meaning that an NGO 
alone would not be able to carry out inter­
ventions at the scale that a government could.
• The private sector
Pro: Private industry can play a key role in 
moving micronutrient interventions forward. 
For example, voluntary wheat flour fortifica­
tion in India started in 1998 with two com­
panies, Kapoor Brothers Roller Mills and 
Vinod Mills. Today, the Roller Flour Millers 
Federation of India is actively involved in dis­
cussion moving toward expanding voluntary 
fortification across the industry.2 For some
2 The Ml published a handbook on vitamin and mineral 
fortification of wheat flour and maize meal that is useful in the process (Wesley and Ranum 2004].
interventions, the private sector has an incen­
tive to participate voluntarily because doing so 
will increase sales (for example, wheat flour 
fortification, marked with a logo]. The private 
sector may also use social marketing to sell 
products. Social marketing of micronutrient 
products [for example, Sprinkles™/Anuka] by 
private companies is an economically and 
socially efficient way of getting these inter­
ventions to the public on a wide scale and 
encourages the Indian economy.
Con: The private sector's bottom line is profit, 
so there is a motivation to cheat. It may be 
that the only appropriate place for the private 
sector is in pure production facilities, moni­
tored and enforced by the government. 
Another argument is that selling micronutrient 
intervention products, rather than providing 
them free of charge, will make them unavailable 
to those who most need them. Micronutrient 
deficiencies are basically the result of market 
failure, so public policy is warranted, and the 
solution should not lie solely with the private 
sector.
• Central government, state governments, NGOs, and 
private industry together
Pro: These different stakeholder groups bring 
together considerable strengths that can create 
the best program funding and implementation. 
NGOs may take the lead on one kind of 
program [such as social marketing of fortified 
porridge], and state governments on another 
(such as distributing fortified porridge in 
schools], while the central government can take 
charge of other programs where economy of 
scale or enforcement power is crucial (such as 
salt iodization]. The private sector can augment 
national policy through efforts such as wheat 
fortification.
Con: Coordination may be difficult. Each 
partner has less control over the final decisions 
and gets less credit for the programs.
Who Should Bo Responsible for Monitoring 
and Enforcing Micronutrient Programs?
In the IMNIP, enforcement of suggested programs 
is left ambiguous. Possible actors for monitoring 
and enforcing micronutrient programs, along with 
a few pros and cons, include the following:
• The government
Pro: The government is the most likely 
enforcer. Current government staff could 
enforce agency and industry compliance with 
micronutrient programs. The government also 
has infrastructure and staff all over the 
country that could be used to monitor micro­
nutrient program outputs [such as supplies 
delivered, meetings held, and children receiving 
supplements].
Con: Currently government enforcement 
mechanisms have weak capacity and are subject 
to corruption. Officials are often not properly 
trained or motivated, and they are poorly paid. 
Bribery is seen as a normal way to increase 
salaries. This problem is particularly evident in 
the case of salt iodization, where enforcers 
oversee individual industries. Industries have 
little to lose by paying off officials, and officials 
are unlikely to be caught. Government 
enforcement of micronutrient programs could 
begin with enforcement of its own codes of 
behavior, perhaps higher salaries, and con­
tinued training of officials. These extra, "behind 
the scenes" expenses are not taken into 
account by typical estimates of monitoring and 
enforcement costs.
• Private industry
Pro: Industries may self-enforce appropriate 
fortification of foods and accurate dosing in 
supplement production.3 This approach would 
be efficient because materials would be 
analyzed on site; it would cost taxpayers less 
than requiring a government official to visit, 
collect samples, and have them analyzed in a 
government laboratory.
Con: Conflict of interest is the basic problem 
in industry self-enforcement. The profit motive 
offers an incentive to ignore bad data, skip the 
tests altogether, or fabricate data.
• Private non-industry
Pro: Press and survey agencies can monitor 
provision of inputs and enforce the quality of 
those inputs through the use of positive or 
negative publicity. For example, a consumer 
group in India regularly collects salt from
various producers, tests it for adequate iodiza­
tion, and publishes the results in newspapers.
Con: Monitoring and enforcement by indi­
vidual survey agencies and the media would 
likely be a diffuse and inconsistent effort. 
Enforcement based on negative publicity 
depends on the readership's commitment to 
high-quality micronutrient products, not to 
mention literacy.
• N G O s
Pro: Some NGOs have extensive monitoring 
and evaluation expertise that could be used for 
incisive monitoring of micronutrient programs. 
They also can create positive or negative pub­
licity about industries based on independent 
monitoring.
Con: The kinds of publicity NGOs can 
produce [issue briefs, newsletters, billboards] 
are more limited in scope than private-owned 
newspapers and magazines. Also, a high level of 
commitment to results in a certain direction 
could limit the credibility of NGO-collected 
monitoring and enforcement data.
Assignment
As a staff member of an NGO that provides nutri­
tion programming consulting, your assignment is 
to recommend to the Government of India how to  
address remaining questions about implementation, 
funding, monitoring, and enforcement of the 
micronutrient programs and to try to  make sure 
the government takes note of your recommenda­
tions.
Additional Readings
Kingdon, J. 2002. Agendas, alternatives, and public 
policies. 2nd ed. New York: Longman.
MI [Micronutrient Initiative], 2005. Controlling 
vitamin and mineral deficiencies in India: 
M eeting the goal. New Delhi. 
http:// www.micronutrient.org/resources/publi 
cations/Controlling%20VMD%20lndia.pdf.
3 The U.S. supplement industry is seif-enforcing.
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